An experimental study on the effect of co-payment in public services

Tarek Jaber-Lopez (), Aurora García-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzís () and Gianandrea Staffiero
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Tarek Jaber-Lopez: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper aims to shed light on the impacts of imposing co-payment on public services, a strategy increasingly employed in the realm of publicly provided healthcare. We analyze the effect of imposing a charge for the individual appropriation of common resources. In our design, withdrawing the maximum amount is the dominant strategy for every player, but the resulting equilibrium is socially inefficient. We find that the presence of a price that is small enough to leave intact the conflict between individual incentives and collective welfare is not effective in reducing appropriation among agents who have previously been acting without it. In fact, the upward trend in the average extraction of common funds continues after the introduction of a price. In an alternative treatment in which we impose copayment from the outset of the experiment, withdrawals are lower than in the free-access baseline. Our results provide insights on the conditions for the effectiveness of co-payment in curbing the over-consumption of public resources

Date: 2016
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Published in The Journal of Socio-Economics, 2016, 65, pp.109-116. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2016.08.002⟩

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Journal Article: An experimental study on the effect of co-payment in public services (2016)
Working Paper: An experimental study on the effects of co-payment in public services (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02975923

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.08.002

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