Contrôle et sanction des chômeurs en présence d'épargne de précaution

Sébastien Ménard

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Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the consequences of monitoring and sanctions on the equilibrium unemployment rate when the workers can self-insure. We use a quantitative dynamic equilibrium search model with endogenous precautionary savings. When an unemployed worker declines a job or if the search intensity is insufficient, a sanction can be applied. The monitoring of search effort has a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment and the monitoring of refusals decreases the search intensity. We also show that poor unemployed workers are less sanctioned than others.

Date: 2019-03-01
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Published in L'actualité économique. Revue d'analyse économique, 2019, 95 (1), pp.73-108. ⟨10.7202/1076385ar⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03027487

DOI: 10.7202/1076385ar

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