 Economic, Social, and Institutional Determinants of Domestic Conflict in Fragile StatesMarie-Ange Véganzonès and
Syed Muhammad All-E-Raza Rizvi ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: In this article, we use Fixed Effect Poisson Regression (FEPR) with robust standard errors to study the economic, social, and institutional determinants of domestic conflict in 58 fragile states over the period 2004 to 2017. We show that effective institutions (measured by judicial effectiveness) and higher incomes would help reduce conflict in these countries. By contrast, democracy would not mitigate violence, democratic experiences generally showing an increase in conflicts in fragile countries. It would also seem that the development of human capacity does not contribute to the reduction of conflict. This would imply that fragile states first improve the social, economic and institutional conditions of their populations before they benefit from political reforms and of education. The same would be true for economic reforms in the context of globalization, which would not help reduce violence in fragile countries either. Keywords: Conflict; Fragile Countries; Economic Reforms; Education; Institutions; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in 56th Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society, Mar 2020, Newport Beach, California, United States There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03048919 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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