EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The effect of competition intensity on software security - An empirical analysis of security patch release on the web browser market

Arrah-Marie Jo ()
Additional contact information
Arrah-Marie Jo: MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR - Université de Rennes - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - UBO - Université de Brest - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université de Rennes 2 - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IBSHS - Institut Brestois des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - UBO - Université de Brest - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], IMT Atlantique - LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of competition intensity on software vendors' security investments when the software is provided free of charge to users. We study the case of software at the center of Internet security, namely the web browser, in which vendors derive their revenue from advertising, and compete in quality. Specifically, using a pooled cross-sectional data set on security patch release on web browsers from 2009 to 2018, we examine how competition intensity affects web browser publishers' promptness to release a security patch. Contrary to many empirical works examining the link between competition and quality, we find that market concentration is not necessarily harmful to quality provision: a higher market concentration positively impacts the vendor's responsiveness in patching vulnerabilities, although this effect is reduced when the vendor is too dominant.

Keywords: free software; information security; software quality; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-26
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in WEIS 2017 : 16th Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Jun 2017, La Jolla, CA, United States

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03098980

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03098980