Gender Violence and the Price of Virginity: Theory and Evidence of Incomplete Marriage Contracts

Daniel L. Chen
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Daniel L. Chen: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper builds and tests a model of marriage as an incomplete contract that arises from asymmetric virginity premiums and examines whether this can lead to social inefficiencies. Contrary to the efficient households hypothesis, women cannot prevent being appropriated by men once they enter marriage if they command lower marriage market opportunities upon divorce. Because men cannot or do not commit to compensating women for their lower ex post marriage market opportunities, marriage is an incomplete contract. Men may seek to lower women's ex ante "market wages" in order to induce entry into joint production. Inefficient or abusive marriages are less likely to separate. Equalizing virginity premiums may reduce domestic and non-domestic violence.

Keywords: Human rights; Economics of the household; Gender-based violence; Values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03170620v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Religion and Demography, 2020, .7 (2), pp.190-221. ⟨10.1163/2589742X-12347108⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03170620

DOI: 10.1163/2589742X-12347108

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