A Keynesian reformulation of the WS-PS model: Keynesian unemployment and Classical unemployment

Nicolas Piluso () and Gabriel Colletis ()
Additional contact information
Gabriel Colletis: LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes Sociaux - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Toulouse - ENSFEA - École Nationale Supérieure de Formation de l'Enseignement Agricole de Toulouse-Auzeville

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The orthodox theory of wage negotiations considers that the trade union monopoly causes a rigidity of real wages which is, itself, the cause of unemployment. The model of this negotiation ("Nash bargaining") only considers situations where negotiations between union and firm succeed. In this article, we attempt to read the WS-PS model from a Keynesian point of view. Our model reflects the fact that successful negotiation is only one case among other situations, including failure where the union expresses a claim that is not necessarily satisfied. Although, in situations close to full employment, there is a bargaining mechanism by which unions and firms reach an agreement, this is not the case in times of massive unemployment. In the latter situation, employment is unilaterally determined by firms, on the basis of previous demand.

Date: 2021-03-16
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-tlse2.hal.science/hal-03171281v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economia politica, 2021, 38 (2), pp.447-460. ⟨10.1007/s40888-021-00222-y⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://univ-tlse2.hal.science/hal-03171281v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Keynesian reformulation of the WS-PS model: Keynesian unemployment and Classical unemployment (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03171281

DOI: 10.1007/s40888-021-00222-y

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().