EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Environmental regulation through nudges

Benjamin Ouvrard (benjamin.ouvrard@inrae.fr) and Anne Stenger (anne.stenger-letheux@inrae.fr)
Additional contact information
Benjamin Ouvrard: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Anne Stenger: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Since the 2000s, public policymakers have taken an interest in a new form of regulation stemming from research in psychology and experimental economics: nudges. This chapter provides an introduction to the type of incentives and discusses their effectiveness in the context of environmental regulation, even though the use of nudges can be imagined in many behavioral spheres. It discusses the ethics of nudges; some of these can be based on the exploitation of cognitive biases, such as default options, which tend to exploit the bias toward the status quo. The chapter illustrates the consequences of cognitive biases for environmental decision‐making using some examples. When a regulator implements a nudge that takes the form of a piece of information communicated to agents about the proper behavior to adopt, the goal is to induce a change in behavior in the individual concerned, so that they will, for example, be more responsible regarding the environment.

Keywords: Cognitive biases; Environmental decision‐making; Environmental regulation; Experimental economics; Nudges; Psychology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Incentives and environmental policies : From theory to empirical novelties, Wiley, pp.47-75, 2019, 9781786303516. ⟨10.1002/9781119597490.ch3⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03177373

DOI: 10.1002/9781119597490.ch3

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD (hal@ccsd.cnrs.fr).

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03177373