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Mitigating Superprincipal Agency Conflicts in Family Firms: The Role of Shareholder Agreements

Emmanuel Boutron, Peter Jaskiewicz (), François Belot, Céline Barrédy and James Combs
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Emmanuel Boutron: UPN SEGMI - Université Paris Nanterre - UFR Sciences économiques, gestion, mathématiques, informatique - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre
Peter Jaskiewicz: École de gestion Telfer / Université d'Ottawa - University of Ottawa [Ottawa]
François Belot: UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine
Céline Barrédy: UL - Université de Lorraine

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Date: 2019
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Published in Southern Management Association Annual Conference, 2019, Norfolk, United States

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