Non-Manipulable Mechanisms: A Brief Overview

Vianney Dequiedt () and David Martimort
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Vianney Dequiedt: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

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Abstract: Manipulation of a mechanism by the principal himself is an issue in a context where there is no grand-mechanism linking the principal and his agents who are instead tied to­gether by a set of bilateral contracts. Taking into account the possibility of manipulations and focusing on mechanisms which are robust to such manipulations restores continuity of the optimal mechanism with respect to the information structure and goes in the direction of modelling weaker in­stitutions than currently assumed in the mechanism design literature. We present an overview of our ongoing research on the subject and highlight some promising applications.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Manipulation; Bilateral contract­ing; Mécanisme incitatif; Manipulations; Contrats bi­latéraux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-01
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Published in Economie publique : Etudes et recherches = Public economics, 2007, 2006/1-2 (18-19), pp.3-16. ⟨10.4000/economiepublique.4392⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03188623

DOI: 10.4000/economiepublique.4392

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