Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point

Jules Selles (), Sylvain Bonhommeau, Patrice Guillotreau and Thomas Vallee
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Jules Selles: BOREA - Biologie des Organismes et Ecosystèmes Aquatiques - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - MNHN - Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles
Sylvain Bonhommeau: IFREMER - Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer

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Abstract: Complex dynamic systems such as common-pool resource systems can undergo a critical shift at a given threshold, the so-called tipping point, which potentially requires substantial changes from the management system. We present in this research a framed laboratory experiment design to examine how the threat of economic sanctions influences the strategic management of a common-pool resource. We use the context of the East Atlantic bluefin tuna international fishery as it has been the archetype of an overfished and mismanaged fishery until a dramatic reinforcement of its regulations followed the threat of a trade ban. We consider endogenous threats and examine their effects on cooperation through harvest decisions taken in the context of non-cooperative game theory in which cooperation could be sustained using a trigger strategy. Our experiment results show that the threat of economic sanctions fosters more cooperative behaviors, less over-exploitation, and a more precautionary management of resources, reducing the economic rent dissipation. This result is exacerbated when the location of the tipping point that triggers the economic sanction is uncertain. In order to avoid free-riding behaviors and foster the emergence of a self-enforcing agreement, we suggest to introduce economic sanctions, such as trade restrictions, associated with uncertain biological limit reference points.

Date: 2020-05
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Published in Environmental and Resource Economics, 2020, 76 (1), pp.153-176. ⟨10.1007/s10640-020-00419-y⟩

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Journal Article: Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03193646

DOI: 10.1007/s10640-020-00419-y

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