Intensive Board Monitoring, Investor Protection and Segment Disclosure Quality: Evidence from EU

Sameh Kobbi-Fakhfakh (), Ridha Mohamed Shabou and Benoît Pigé ()
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Sameh Kobbi-Fakhfakh: Université de Sfax
Ridha Mohamed Shabou: Université de Sfax
Benoît Pigé: CREGO - Centre de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UB - Université de Bourgogne - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Abstract: This study examined the association between intensive board monitoring (IBM) and segment disclosure quality (SDQ). It also investigated whether this association can be moderated by firm's home country investor protection (IP) level. Based on a panel of 271 non-financial European Union (EU) listed corporations covering the 2007–2012 period, this study estimated two multiple regression models including industry and year fixed effects. We found evidence that the segment disclosure quality is higher when a majority of outside directors serve on monitoring committees. We, also, found that the positive association between IBM and SDQ is more pronounced for firms in a weak IP environment and less pronounced for firms in a strong IP environment. Thus, we provided evidence in favor of a substitutive relationship between IBM and IP level with respect to their association with SDQ. Our findings are evidenced by several robustness tests.

Keywords: Segment disclosure quality; Intensive board monitoring; Monitoring/oversight committees; Investor protection; EU context (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-02
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Published in Accounting in Europe, 2020, 17 (1), pp.52-77. ⟨10.1080/17449480.2019.1646427⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03199984

DOI: 10.1080/17449480.2019.1646427

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