English versus American rule: an experimental analysis
Règle anglaise versus règle américaine d’allocation des frais de justice: une analyse expérimentale
Yannick Gabuthy (),
Emmanuel Peterle () and
Jean-Christian Tisserand
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Yannick Gabuthy: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
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Abstract:
In this paper, we conduct an experiment in order to analyze how the trial costs allocation rule (i.e., American or English rule) may shape the efficiency of the litigation process, via its effect on the attorney's effort, the deterrence of meritless claims and the plaintiff's incentives to go to court. It appears that the English rule helps to screen out low-quality claims, partly by lessening attorneys' incentives to provide effort to defend such cases ex post (and hence discouraging potential clients to go to trial ex ante).
Keywords: litigation; Fee-shifting rules; Moral hazard; Experiments; Règle d'allocation des frais de justice; Expérimentation; Aléa Moral; Litiges (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Published in Revue Economique, 2020, 71 (6), pp.973-1004. ⟨10.3917/reco.716.0973⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03211963
DOI: 10.3917/reco.716.0973
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