Understanding Differences in Peer Reporting Practices: Evidence from Tax Evasion Games in Moldova and France

Rustam Romaniuc (), Dimitri Dubois, Eugen Dimant, Adrian Lupusor and Valeriu Prohnitchi
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Rustam Romaniuc: CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur les Entreprises - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne
Adrian Lupusor: Expert-Grup
Valeriu Prohnitchi: Expert-Grup

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Abstract: Authorities rely on reports from private citizens to detect and enforce more than a trivial portion of effective law-breaking. The present article is the first to study the cultural aspect of peer reporting experimentally. By collecting data in a post-Soviet country (Moldova), we focus in particular on how the Soviet legacy of using citizens as private informants may have a long-lasting effect on their willingness to cooperate with state authorities. We then contrast those effects with peer reporting behavior in France, a Western society. Our results suggest that participants in Moldova view cooperation with authorities as less socially acceptable than their counterparts in France. Our results also suggest that participants in Moldova engage less frequently in peer reporting than individuals in France. However, we also find that less peer reporting does not necessarily imply less tax compliance. Participants in both countries exhibit very similar tax compliance rates. We explain the effect of peer reporting on tax compliance in Moldova using the country's past experience during the Soviet era, when being reported to authorities was common and carried grave consequences.

Date: 2021-09-01
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Published in Public Choice, 2021, 190, pp.127-147

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03219572

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