The evolutionary stability of in-group altruism in productive and destructive group contests
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This article examines the evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences in a group contest for a prize, which is endogenously determined. In a destructive contest, such as war, contest e¤orts of all groups decrease the value of the prize. In contrast, in a productive contest, such as a patent race, contest e¤orts of all groups increase the value of the prize. The indirect evolutionary approach allows to endogenize players'preferences, that is, the utility weights given by a group member, in her subjective utility function, to the mater- ial payo¤s of in-group and out-group members. After characterizing the set of evolutionarily stable preference types, I show that the evolutionary stable degree of in-group altruism is always stronger when the group contest is destructive than when it is productive. Moreover, when the group contest is strongly productive, preference evolution leads to in-group spite. However, a smaller group size and a larger number of competing groups makes this outcome less likely.
Keywords: Group Contests; Endogenous Prize; In-group Altruism; Evolutionary Stability; Indirect Evolutionary Approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2021, 188, pp.236-252. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.017⟩
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Journal Article: The evolutionary stability of in-group altruism in productive and destructive group contests (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03233980
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