Hybrid governances complementary to contracts in international fair trade orange juice

Governanças híbridas complementares aos contratos no comércio justo citrícola internacional

Melise Dantas Machado Bouroullec and Luiz Fernando Paulillo
Additional contact information
Melise Dantas Machado Bouroullec: UFSCar - Universidade Federal de São Carlos [São Carlos]
Luiz Fernando Paulillo: INP - PURPAN - Ecole d'Ingénieurs de Purpan - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - UT - Université de Toulouse, UFSCar - Federal University of São Carlos

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The increased complexity of global competitiveness and the new strategies of the industrial oligopolies have stimulated studies on the effectiveness of business coordination mechanisms that are different from spot market and include contractual properties, influence on networks, resource sharing, distinct forms of leadership, etc. According to Menard (2004), these mechanisms are complementary to contracts and are called hybrid governance structures. This work has the objective of showing the employment of the hybrid governance in transactions between legally independent organizations that chose to coordinate part of their joint activities. The sector chosen was the chain of fair trade orange juice (traditional and organic), and the main actors involved are Brazilian orange growers' organizations, European buyers, and international certifiers of fair trade. Particular emphasis was given to the coordination mechanisms that are complementary to contracts and which were firstly highlighted by Menard (2004). Those mechanisms of coordination are assured by a private certifier that is accepted voluntarily by the actors involved. This certifier authority, which can be more or less formal, coordinates several factors involved in transactions involving a mixed type of governance that includes control and incentives.

Date: 2010-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Gestão & Produção, 2010, 17 (4), pp.761-773. ⟨10.1590/S0104-530X2010000400010⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03246817

DOI: 10.1590/S0104-530X2010000400010

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().