 Rachat d’entreprise par les cadres dirigeants, modalités de contrôle et performance: le cas des PME françaises non cotées reprises par leurs dirigeants (2002-2012)Jean-Etienne Palard
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: This article studies the evolution of growth and performance of non-listed French SMEs acquired through a Management Buy-Out (MBO) and the influence of Private Equity funds in this process. According to the agency theory, this type of acquisition can offer many benefits: new financing capacities, reduction of agency costs, improvement of operating efficiency. However, these positive effects must be counterbalanced by the reduction of investment and the increase of bankruptcy costs. The empirical study is built on a propensity score matching model from a sample of 208 MBOs carried out on French SMEs between 2002 and 2012. The results show that the growth and the performance of acquired SMEs is not faster nor stronger than the growth of matched companies. On the other hand, if the development of SMEs under MBO seems to accelerate after the buyout, the influence of PE funds does not appear significant in this process. Keywords: Agency theory; Debt; Development of SMEs; Management buyouts (MBO); Private equity; Desarrollo de negocios; Desempeno; Deuda; Teoria de agencia; Croissance des PME; Endettement; Performance; Théorie de l’agence (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Revue Internationale PME, 2021, 34 (1), pp.51-70. ⟨10.7202/1076460ar⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03252365 DOI: 10.7202/1076460ar Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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