 L’impact des LBO sur la défaillance des entreprisesLe cas des cibles françaises (2000-2010)Nicolas Bedu () and
Jean-Etienne Palard
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: This article investigates whether leveraged buy-out (LBO) transactions increase or decrease the risk of financial distress of French companies. According to agency theory, the increase of the bankruptcy risk, induced by rising debt levels, should be offset by the introduction of new governance mechanisms that improve business performance and ultimately reduce the risk of failure. The empirical study is based on a propensity score matching model which focuses on a sample of 626 LBOs with 55 operations that have experienced financial distress between 2000 and 2010 in France. The results show that the failure rate is significantly higher in the sample than the matched firms in the model. Moreover, the rate of bankruptcy is positively correlated with the post-acquisition debt level and the economic return before and after the buyout. Keywords: Leveraged buyouts (LBO); Financial distress; Bankruptcy; Financial structure; Debt; Agency theory; Défaillance d’entreprise; Faillite; Structure financière; Endettement; Théorie de l’agence (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2014, 17-2, ⟨10.4000/fcs.1465⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03262021 DOI: 10.4000/fcs.1465 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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