When Managers Become Robin Hoods: A Mixed Method Investigation

Russell Cropanzano, Daniel Skarlicki, Thierry Nadisic, Marion Fortin, Phoenix van Wagoner and Ksenia Keplinger
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Marion Fortin: TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse

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Abstract: When subordinates have suffered an unfairness, managers sometimes try to compensate them by allocating something extra that belongs to the organization. These reactions, which we label as managerial Robin Hood behaviors, are undertaken without the consent of senior leadership. In four studies, we present and test a theory of managerial Robin Hoodism. In study 1, we found that managers themselves reported engaging in Robin Hoodism for various reasons, including a moral concern with restoring justice. Study 2 results suggested that managerial Robin Hoodism is more likely to occur when the justice violations involve distributive and interpersonal justice rather than procedural justice violations. In studies 3 and 4, when moral identity (trait or primed) was low, both distributive and interpersonal justice violations showed similar relationships to managerial Robin Hoodism. However, when moral identity was high, interpersonal justice violations showed a strong relationship to managerial Robin Hoodism regardless of the level of distributive justice.

Keywords: Organizational justice; managerial Robin Hood behaviors; deonance; moral identity; positive deviance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07-01
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Published in Business Ethics Quarterly, 2021, pp.1-34. ⟨10.1017/beq.2021.16⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03279188

DOI: 10.1017/beq.2021.16

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