Do all inside and affiliated directors hold the same value for shareholders?

Etienne Redor
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Etienne Redor: Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School

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Abstract: In this paper, we re-question the value of board independence for shareholders. Instead of studying the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance (as in previous studies), we analyse how shareholders perceive board independence by examining the relations between director independence and shareholder satisfaction as measured by shareholder voting outcomes in annual director elections. This approach allows us to overcome concerns about omitted firm-level characteristics and to propose a finer analysis of the value of board independence/affiliation for shareholders. We show (1) that independent and inside directors receive significantly more, and affiliated directors significantly fewer, 'for' votes in director elections than other board members, (2) that not all inside and affiliated directors hold the same value for shareholders and (3) that the leadership structure matters to shareholders.

Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2021

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