Economics at your fingertips  

Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Economic research and policy implications

Stephanie Assad, Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari (), Robert Clark (), Vincenzo Denicolo, Daniel Ershov, Justin Pappas Johnson, Sergio Pastorello, Andrew Rhodes (), Lei Xu and Matthijs Wildenbeest ()
Additional contact information
Daniel Ershov: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Markets are being populated with new generations of pricing algorithms, powered with Artificial Intelligence, that have the ability to autonomously learn to operate. This ability can be both a source of efficiency and cause of concern for the risk that algorithms autonomously and tacitly learn to collude. In this paper we explore recent developments in the economic literature and discuss implications for policy.

Keywords: Algorithmic Pricing; Antitrust; Competition Policy; Artificial Intelligence; Collusion; Platforms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cmp, nep-com and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2021, 37 (3), pp.459-478. ⟨10.1093/oxrep/grab011⟩

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Autonomous algorithmic collusion: economic research and policy implications (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Economic research and policy implications (2021) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/grab011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

Page updated 2022-09-27
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03360129