A critical note on the scientific conception of economics: claiming for a methodological pluralism

Rouven Reinke
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Rouven Reinke: UHH - Universität Hamburg = University of Hamburg

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Abstract: Opponents of mainstream economics have not yet called attention to the lack of in-depth examination of the general scientific conception of modern economics. However, economic science cannot consistently fulfil the epistemological and ontological requirements of the scientific standards underlying this conception. What can be scientifically recognized as true cannot be answered, neither through the actual ontological structure of the object of observation nor through a methodological demarcation. These limitations necessarily lead to the claim for both a pragmatic and a radical methodological pluralism.

Keywords: pluralism; scientific conception; mainstream economics; methodology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-hme, nep-hpe and nep-pke
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03374887v2
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Published in Journal of Philosophical Economics, 2021, Volume XIV Issue 1-2 (1-2), pp.108-135. ⟨10.46298/jpe.8664⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03374887

DOI: 10.46298/jpe.8664

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