État prébendier et politiques industrielles au Cambodge

François Bafoil ()
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François Bafoil: CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Applied to Cambodia, the notion of the prebendary state refers to the capacity of political elites to organize the internal market on the basis of concessions reserved for those in their immediate circle and contracts signed with foreign investors entailing the exchange of financial gifts for legal deregulation and the privatization of violence. In the domain of industrial policy, this authoritarian form of patrimonial domination is embodied by special economic zones. These zones underscore the agreements reached between public actors and private investors, the Tayloristic organization of labor within firms and the absence of professional relations. As a result, these zones are very weakly linked to regional development flows in the Mekong Basin, suggesting that the Cambodian case be seen as a degraded instance of "developmentalism". (Résumé de l'éditeur)

Keywords: Cambodge; Khmers rouges; Occupation vietnamienne; Echanges commerciaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
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Published in Critique Internationale, 2014, 65, pp.105 - 125. ⟨10.3917/crii.065.0105⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03393416

DOI: 10.3917/crii.065.0105

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