Do Central Bank forecasts influence private agents? Forecasting Performance vs. Signals

Paul Hubert

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Abstract: Focusing on a set of central banks that publish inflation forecasts in real time, this paper aims to establish whether central bank inflation forecasts influence private inflation forecasts. The response is positive in the five countries studied: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan. Three hypotheses may explain this central bank influence: central bank forecasts are more accurate than private ones, are based on different information sets, and/or convey signals about future policy decisions and policymakers' preferences and objectives. We provide evidence that the source of these central banks' influence is not linked to their forecasting performance.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Imperfect information; Communication; Forecasts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2015, 47 (4), pp.771-789 - 789. ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12227⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Do Central Bank forecasts influence private agents? Forecasting Performance vs. Signals (2015)
Working Paper: Do central banks forecast influence private agents ? Forecasting performance vs. signals (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03399242

DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12227

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