Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts *

Pierre-Henri Morand () and François Maréchal ()
Additional contact information
Pierre-Henri Morand: LBNC - Laboratoire Biens, Normes, Contrats - AU - Avignon Université
François Maréchal: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article analyzes the use of social and environmental clauses in public procurement contracts. After describing the current French legal context, it shows how a mechanism design approach can explain the factors that theoretically justify such practices, potentially including favoritism and rent-seeking. An empirical analysis is then carried out on the French public procurement data set for the year 2017. It illustrates the weight of political preferences in the choice to resort to social clauses and the weight of the preferences of the local chief executive to explain the use of environmental clauses. It also highlights that social and environmental clauses do not seem to be used as a tool for favoritism.

Keywords: Public procurement; social clauses; environmental clauses; favoritism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-env
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03418572v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in European Journal of Political Economy, In press

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-03418572v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03418572

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().