The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières (sylvain.ferrieres@univ-fcomte.fr) and Philippe Solal
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Sylvain Ferrières: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Date: 2021-09
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, In press, ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00799-5⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure (2022)
Working Paper: The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure (2020)
Working Paper: The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03422935

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00799-5

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