Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
André Casajus: Leipzig University / Universität Leipzig
Eric Rémila: GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Date: 2021-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2021, 302 (1), pp.23-47. ⟨10.1007/s10479-021-04005-3⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03422949

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04005-3

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().