Fair Social Ordering, Egalitarianism, and Animal Welfare

Marc Fleurbaey and Martin Van der Linden

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Abstract: We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one public good representing the welfare of other species. We show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to humans while always respecting humans' unanimous preferences. One solution is to respect unanimous preferences only when doing so does not lead to a decrease in the welfare of other species. Social preferences satisfying these properties reveal surprising connections between concerns for other species, egalitarianism among humans, and unanimity: the latter two imply a form of dictatorship from humans with the strongest preference for the welfare of other species. (JEL D11, D63, H41)

Date: 2021-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03426174v1
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Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13 (4), pp.466-491. ⟨10.1257/mic.20190091⟩

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Journal Article: Fair Social Ordering, Egalitarianism, and Animal Welfare (2021)
Working Paper: Fair Social Ordering, Egalitarianism, and Animal Welfare (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03426174

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190091

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