The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super-Majority Rules

Yves Balasko and Hervé Crès ()
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Yves Balasko: Department of Economics and Related Studies - University of York [York, UK]

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Abstract: Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!−1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionThis expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.

Date: 1997-08
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03458336v1
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1997, 75 (2), pp.237 - 270. ⟨10.1006/jeth.1996.2233⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03458336

DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2233

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