Normes sociales et politiques européennes

Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Francesco Saraceno ()
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Francesco Saraceno: OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po

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Abstract: This paper reviews the debate on the Stability and Growth Pact. Both empirical and theoretical arguments in favour of the Pact are weak, to warrant a different and plausible (even if extreme) hypothesis: We suggest the view that the Stability Pact is a public social norm, obeyed by countries because of the fear of reputation losses. Our simple model shows that reputation issues may cause the emergence of a stable but inferior equilibrium. Within this framework, the enlargement to more undisciplined countries may worsen the problems posed by the Pact.

Keywords: Pacte de stabilité; Politiques de stabilisation; Normes sociales; Réputation; Élargissement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03459615
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Published in Revue de l'OFCE, 2007, 102, pp.283 - 314. ⟨10.3917/reof.102.0283⟩

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Journal Article: Normes sociales et politiques européennes (2007)
Working Paper: Normes sociales et politiques européennes (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03459615

DOI: 10.3917/reof.102.0283

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