Le RSA: redistribution vers les travailleurs pauvres et offre de travail

Guillaume Allègre ()

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Abstract: The RSA follows two objectives: to increase the living standard of the working poor and to eliminate inactivity traps that result from low financial incentives to work. Because of its familialized nature, the RSA targets relatively well the poorest workers but also creates ambiguous effects in terms of financial incentives. We estimate the redistributive and incentive effects by microsimulation. We find that 65% of ‘RSA activity' benefits are perceived by households in the first two deciles of living standards; nearly 400 000 individuals could surpass the poverty threshold. We also consider the impact of RSA activity on the labour supply of women: participation would be reduced by 12 000. In conclusion, we consider ways to reform the RSA.

Keywords: RSA; Microsimulation; Redistribution; Incitations; Travailleurs pauvres; Offre de travail (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03461520
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Revue de l'OFCE, 2011, 118, pp.33 - 61. ⟨10.3917/reof.118.0033⟩

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Journal Article: Le RSA: redistribution vers les travailleurs pauvres et offre de travail (2011)
Working Paper: Le RSA: redistribution vers les travailleurs pauvres et offre de travail (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03461520

DOI: 10.3917/reof.118.0033

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