Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory

Bence Bago and Wim De Neys
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Bence Bago: LIPADE - EA 2517 - Laboratoire d'Informatique Paris Descartes - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5, LaPsyDÉ - UMR 8240 - Laboratoire de psychologie du développement et de l'éducation de l'enfant - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Wim De Neys: LIPADE - EA 2517 - Laboratoire d'Informatique Paris Descartes - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5, LaPsyDÉ - UMR 8240 - Laboratoire de psychologie du développement et de l'éducation de l'enfant - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Influential dual process models of human thinking posit that reasoners typically produce a fast, intuitive heuristic (i.e., Type-1) response which might subsequently be overridden and corrected by slower, deliberative processing (i.e., Type-2). In this study we directly tested this time course assumption. We used a two response paradigm in which participants have to give an immediate answer and afterwards are allowed extra time before giving a final response. In four experiments we used a range of procedures (e.g., challenging response deadline, concurrent load) to knock out Type 2 processing and make sure that the initial response was intuitive in nature. Our key finding is that we frequently observe correct, logical responses as the first, immediate response. Response confidence and latency analyses indicate that these initial correct responses are given fast, with high confidence, and in the face of conflicting heuristic responses. Findings suggest that fast and automatic Type 1 processing also cues a correct logical response from the start. We sketch a revised dual process model in which the relative strength of different types of intuitions determines reasoning performance.

Keywords: Dual process theory; Reasoning; Conflict detection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Cognition, 2017, 158, pp.90-109. ⟨10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03510054

DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014

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