Reputation versus the need for enemies

Réputation versus besoin d'ennemis

Maxime Menuet and Patrick Villieu

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Abstract: Why don't politicians solve undesirable problems? One reason is that politicians may be induced not to solve the problems in order to keep an electoral advantage. This article shows that, if the politicians' career depends on the problems they can solve with competence, the reforms they will implement will result from the trade-off between reputation and the need to keep enemies alive.

Keywords: Economie politique; Besoin d'ennemis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://uca.hal.science/hal-03514044v1
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Published in 2020

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