Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power

Sven Heim and Georg Götz

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Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-reg
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Published in Energy Policy, 2021, 155, pp.112308. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power (2021)
Working Paper: Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? - Evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power (2013)
Working Paper: Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03519694

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308

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