Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: The Effect of Board of Directors and Audit Committee Independence

Taher Hamza and Nada Mselmi ()
Additional contact information
Nada Mselmi: LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR7322] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of board and audit committee independence on firm market performance. Using a sample of French listed firms, we find a negative and significant relation between board independence and equity returns. This suggests that appointing more independent directors fails in enhancing firm stock returns. Furthermore, we show that firms with independent audit committees exhibit higher equity returns. We analyze three portfolios sorted by the percentage of independent directors on boards and audit committees using Carhart's model and find that the portfolio of firms with low board independence and high audit committee independence exhibits the highest abnormal returns. JEL Classification: G34, G11

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Management international = International management = Gestión internacional, 2017, 21 (2), pp.152-164. ⟨10.7202/1052694ar⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03528491

DOI: 10.7202/1052694ar

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().