Organizing Competition for the Market

Elisabetta Iossa, Patrick Rey and Michael Waterson

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms.

Keywords: Dynamic procurement; Incumbency advantage; Local monopoly; Competition; Asymmetric auctions; Synchronous contracts; Staggered contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cwa, nep-mic and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03551028v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, In press, pp.1-66. ⟨10.1093/jeea/jvab044⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-03551028v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Organising Competition for the Market (2022)
Working Paper: Organizing Competition for the Market (2019)
Working Paper: Organizing Competition for the Market (2019)
Working Paper: Organizing Competition for the Market (2019)
Working Paper: Organizing Competition for the Market (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03551028

DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvab044

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().