Rivalités régionales et financements des insurrections

Mahdi Fawaz
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Mahdi Fawaz: GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Direct inter-state wars have become particularly constraining and the strategy of funding rebel groups located in rival countries has many advantages. By exploiting the resources at their disposal, rentier states can finance insurgency activities in rival countries. This paper empirically demonstrates that for a given country, the natural resource rents available to its rivals have a systematic effect on its likelihood of experiencing civil war. This result is stable when we control only for rents from oil exports.

Keywords: Interstate rivalry; Civil war; External support; State capacity; opportunity cost of insurrection; Rivalité interétatique; Guerre civile; Financement extérieur; Capacité étatique; Coûts d'opportunité du conflit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12-14
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2021, Vol. 131 (6), pp.927-950. ⟨10.3917/redp.316.0107⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03557389

DOI: 10.3917/redp.316.0107

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