Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions

Emmanuel Lorenzon ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider a private-value auction with one-sided incomplete information in which two objects are sold in a sequence of two second-price auctions. The buyers have multiunit demand and are asymmetrically informed at the ex ante stage of the game. One buyer perfectly knows his type, and the other buyer is uninformed about her own type. We consider interim information acquisition by the uninformed buyer and derive an asymmetric equilibrium that is shown to produce a declining price sequence across both sales. The supermartingale property of the price sequence stems from the uninformed buyer's incentives to gather private information, which leads to aggressive bidding in the first-stage auction.

Keywords: Sequential auctions; Uninformed bidding; Multiunit demand; Declining price anomaly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-20
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2023, 23 (1), pp.155-179. ⟨10.1515/bejte-2021-0009⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03558786

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().