Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations

Yves Balasko and Hervé Crès ()
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Yves Balasko: Department of Economics and Related Studies - University of York [York, UK]

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Abstract: Simple majority voting between pairs of alternatives is used to aggregate individual preferences. The occurrence of Condorcet cycles is limited thanks to a principle of homogeneity on individual preferences. The restrictions induced on the domain of the latters are weak: among the n! possible orderings of n alternatives, more than one half are admissible within a domain. The resulting aggregated preference has then a neglectable probability of showing up cycles. We show moreover that the set of individual preferences can be 'naturally' partitioned into two such domains.

Date: 1998
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1998

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03567702

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