Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Robert J. Gary‐bobo and Alain Trannoy
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Robert J. Gary‐bobo: UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Date: 2015
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Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2015

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2013)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2013)
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