Renegotiations and Renewals of Public Contracts

Jean Beuve and Stephane Saussier ()
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Jean Beuve: UP1 UFR06 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR Gestion & économie d'entreprise - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the impact of renegotiations on contract renewals. Using an original dataset of procurement contracts in the French car park sector, we show that there exists an optimal level of renegotiations that positively affects the probability of renewing a contract with the same partner. This result holds only when public authorities have discretionary power during the awarding procedure. Such findings suggest that what is usually interpreted as a sign of weakness – frequent renegotiations – might well be good news that indicates that the contracting parties can make contracts adaptable over time.

Date: 2021-11
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Published in Review of Industrial Organization, 2021, 59 (3), pp.461-482. ⟨10.1007/s11151-021-09819-w⟩

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Journal Article: Renegotiations and Renewals of Public Contracts (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03576157

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09819-w

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