Recapitalisations des banques et aléa moral en Hongrie et en Pologne

Jérôme Sgard ()
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Jérôme Sgard: CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper presents the Hungarian and Polish bank recapitalization programs implemented since 1992 and put them in the longer term perspective of the restructuring of financial systems. Their opposite results are linked to diverging schemes of microeconomic constraints and incentives. It is also shown that the risk of moral hazard, which is present in any intervention of this kind, is strongly reinforced in the transition context : this is due to a situation where banks are often captured by large public enterprises, and, more generally, to the strong resistance opposed by many agents to the hardenning of the com­petitive and financial constraints put upon them.

Keywords: Restructuration des systèmes financiers; Déficits budgétaires; Evolution des banques commerciales; Recapitalisation bancaire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03585854
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Published in Revue Economique, 1995, 46 (2), pp.481 - 500. ⟨10.2307/3502200⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03585854

DOI: 10.2307/3502200

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