Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Mich Tvede and Hervé Crès ()
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Hervé Crès: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at mostpercent of the shareholders. It is shown that a-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists ifwhereSis the number of states at the last date andJis the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller's.

Date: 2005-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Economic Theory, 2005, 26 (4), pp.887 - 906. ⟨10.1007/s00199-004-0537-x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03598171

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0537-x

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