Deliberative Democracy and Utilitarianism

Antoine Billot and Xiangyu Qu

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Abstract: This paper explores the possibility, in case of belief and taste heterogeneity, to aggregate individual preferences through a deliberation process enabling society to reach a consensus. However, we show that the same deliberation process, even characterized by a convergent matrix, may lead to different consensus depending on the updating rule which is chosen by individuals, i.e., deliberation is sufficient to determine social preferences but not univocally. Then, we prove that the Pareto condition allows to choose from possible consensus the one whereby social deliberated beliefs and tastes are of a utilitarian shape.

Date: 2022
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, inPress, ⟨10.1007/s00355-022-01404-8⟩

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Journal Article: Deliberative democracy and utilitarianism (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberative Democracy and Utilitarianism (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03608240

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01404-8

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