Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures

Ahmad Awde (), Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Julien Yves Rolland () and Abdelmonaim Tlidi
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Ahmad Awde: FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174) - UTBM - Université de Technologie de Belfort-Montbeliard - ENSMM - Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Mécanique et des Microtechniques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Julien Yves Rolland: LMB - Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Besançon (UMR 6623) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Abdelmonaim Tlidi: UAE - Abdelmalek Essaadi University [Tétouan] = Université Abdelmalek Essaadi [Tétouan]

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Abstract: A candidate is said to be socially acceptable if the number of voters who rank her among the most preferred half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her among the least preferred half (Mahajne and Volij, 2018). For every voting profile, there always exists at least one socially acceptable candidate. This candidate may not be elected by some well-known voting rules, which may even lead in some cases to the election of a socially unacceptable candidate, the latter being a candidate such that the number of voters who rank her among the most preferred half of the candidates is strictly less than the number of voters who rank her among the least preferred half. In this paper, our contribution is twofold. First, since the existence of a socially unacceptable candidate is not always guaranteed, we determine the probabilities of the existence of such a candidate. Then, we evaluate how often the Plurality rule, the Negative Plurality rule, the Borda rule and their two-round versions can elect a socially unacceptable candidate. We perform our calculations under both the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture,

Keywords: Voting; Social Unacceptability; Scoring Rules; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mfd, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03614587v1
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Published in Springer, Cham. Advances in Collective Decision Making, pp.25-42, 2023, Studies in Choice and Welfare, 978-3-031-21695-4. ⟨10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_3⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03614587

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_3

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