Efficiency and decentralization: an empirical analysis of European merger control

Efficience et décentralisation: une analyse empirique du contrôle européen des concentrations

Benoît Berquier
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Benoît Berquier: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article aims to analyze the effects of the 2004 reform of European merger control on the efficiency of the control mechanism. It is in line with the European Commission's programme to improve the performance of its administrations. Using a performance analysis methodology (unbiased multi-period DEA model), this article shows that the current technical and legislative framework in which the control process evolves can absorb the increase in the number of merger projects processed per year without causing strain on the system. It is therefore built to be more efficient. Nevertheless, even if the reform has made it possible to put in place a system that responds to the increase in the number of notifications, it remains under-used.

Keywords: commission européenne; contrôle des concentrations; efficience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03-30
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Published in Politiques et Management public, 2022, 1 (1), pp.91-120. ⟨10.3166/pmp.39.2022.0004⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03647625

DOI: 10.3166/pmp.39.2022.0004

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