L’externalisation de la fonction comptable à l’épreuve de la théorie du signal

Guillaume Chanson and Véronique Rougès ()
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Guillaume Chanson: PRISM Sorbonne - Pôle de recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences du management - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Véronique Rougès: PRISM Sorbonne - Pôle de recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences du management - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: Despite legal constraints, there is an information asymmetry concerning the quality of financial statements. The outsourcing of accounting services may work as a signal, in as far as it sets a limit on earnings management. We build a theoretical framework based on the signaling theory to explain the outsourcing of accounting services. We test the theoretical frame on a sample of 123 French companies. Three hypotheses are corroborated: listed and highly indebted companies use external accounting services more frequently; companies with two external auditors do not.

Keywords: signaling theory; outsourcing; accounting services; earnings management; théorie du signal; externalisation; comptabilité; gestion des données comptables (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-09
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2012, 15-3, ⟨10.4000/fcs.1189⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03678666

DOI: 10.4000/fcs.1189

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