Disclosures, Rollover Risk and Debt Runs

Sylvain Carré ()
Additional contact information
Sylvain Carré: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: How do opacity and disclosure policies impact short-term debt financing costs and the likelihood and cost of debt runs? I construct a dynamic model where debt yields are endogenous and mapped explicitly to the degree of transparency, the regulatory disclosure regime and the state of the economy. Different disclosure policies generate sharp differences in the rich debt and beliefs dynamics that I obtain. Short-term yields may remain low while bank's asset quality deteriorates, and a disclosure regime might consistently induce better beliefs but imply larger financing costs. At the policy level, my model predicts that the regulator should commit to disclose except at large levels of opacity.

Keywords: Dynamic debt runs; Opacity; Disclosure policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, 2022, 142

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03689748

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().