When do privatizations have popular support? A voting model

Rim Lahmandi-Ayed and Didier Laussel ()

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Abstract: We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences, where workers and consumers are differentiated respectively by their sensitivity to effort and their intensity of preference for quality. We consider a public monopoly, i.e. which is owned equally by all individuals. The question is under which conditions the firm will be privatized and at which rate/price. The decisions are taken through majority vote in a plurality system. When the firm is controlled by the State, the price is determined through a vote among all the population. Otherwise, the price is the one which maximizes the profit. We prove that, when the maximum disutility of working in the firm is higher than the maximum utility of consuming its output, privatization may emerge as a possible choice of the majority, even if no hypothesis is made on the efficiency of a private management relative to a public one.

Keywords: Democracy; General equilibrium; Privatization; Vertical preferences; Majority vote; Public monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-03702671
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, 100, pp.102633. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102633⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03702671

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102633

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