Dealing With COVID-19 Through Employee Stock Ownership Plans

Nicolas Aubert () and Miguel Cordova
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Miguel Cordova: PUCP - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú = Pontifical Catholic University of Peru

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Abstract: In this chapter, the authors argue that far from the shocking decision of firing employees to leverage their short-term liquidity, organizations may draw other innovative options such as giving company shares to their employees. Employee stock ownership (ESO) plans have the potential to secure financial liquidity for firms while simultaneously providing social inclusion as well as empowerment to people, relating their efforts directly to firms' performance and driving the economic system into a shared capitalism. However, while companies may be solving their financial constraints through ESO, the authors identified a trade-off related to the traditional position of hegemony of firms. They argue that the decision to share the risk through paying wages using firms' stock options derives in a progressive detriment of power and control that some organizations would not be willing to suffer.

Date: 2022
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Published in Employee Share Ownership and Impacts on Organizational Value and Behavior, IGI Global, pp.1-17, 2022, Advances in Business Strategy and Competitive Advantage, ⟨10.4018/978-1-7998-8557-3.ch001⟩

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Working Paper: Dealing With COVID-19 Through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03723166

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-8557-3.ch001

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