 Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goodsPost-Print from HAL Abstract: This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where players are listed on one side and the public good groups they form are listed on the other side. The main result of the paper shows the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash equilibrium is also shown to be asymptotically stable. Then the paper provides some comparative statics analysis regarding pure redistribution, taxation and subsidies. It appears that small redistributions of wealth may sometimes be neutral, but generally, the effects of redistributive policies depend on how public good groups are related in the contribution network structure. Keywords: multiple public goods; warm-glow effects; bipartite contri- bution structure; Nash equilibrium; comparative statics; Théories des jeux (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, 47 (4), pp.1211-1238. ⟨10.1007/s00182-018-0616-z⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03732089 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0616-z Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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